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Abstract 
This paper presents an approach to uniquely identify users and to 
retrieve their data distributed in profiles stored in different 
systems. The objective is exploiting the public user data available 
in the Web and especially in social networks. The approach does 
not require the implementation of specific protocols and the 
provision of authentication data. The evaluation provides good 
results that encourage us in carrying on the extension of the 
project. The extension we are working on is aimed at aggregating, 
using heuristic techniques, the data stored in the retrieved profiles 
and at inferring new data about the user. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.4 [Information Interfaces And Presentation]: Hypertext/ 
Hypermedia – User issues. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
User Model Interoperability, Social Web, User Identification. 
1. Introduction 
In the current Web, most of the websites collect data about users 
to provide different services. This implies that a lot of data on a 
specific user (e.g. his/her preferences, interests, activities, etc.) are 
scattered over many systems on the Web and the user profile is 
inherently distributed. This phenomenon grew with the diffusion 
of Social Web and social systems, which store lots of data, often  
 
public, about users.1 
Given this context, an interesting opportunity is to develop 
environments that effectively enable systems to benefit from the 
distributed knowledge about users, favoring the exchange and 
reuse of user data for adaptation purposes [1,7]. This is known as 
“cross-system personalization”. Many researches have explored 
cross-system personalization, focusing on issues such as the 
communication among distributed systems [2], the heterogeneity 
management of distributed user and domain data [7, 1], the 
protection of user's privacy during the interoperability process [9] 
and the identification of the user whose data are exchanged 
among systems [3, 5, 13]. This last issue is a starting requirement 
to enable cross-system personalization since it means, for the 
different systems partaking into the user data exchange process, to 
discover if they are referring to the same user. The problem is 
particularly critical in the context of the Social Web, where users 
are often identified by nicknames chosen by themselves.  
This paper presents an approach and an algorithm to support 
adaptive systems to uniquely identify users in different social 
systems. The approach we present does not require the provision 
of authentication data and user identification is performed by 
using the public data available on the Web.  
In a cross-system personalization perspective, the contribution 
of this approach is creating new opportunities for gathering more 
user data to reach better adaptation results.  
To show how the algorithm can be exploited, let us consider 
the scenario of an adaptive system that knows a small set of data 
about a user, like the nickname (s)he uses in that system, for 
example billsmith, the gender, for example male, and the country, 
for example US, California. Collecting further data about 
billsmith would allow the adaptive system to extend the profile of 
the user and consequently to improve the adaptation result. But 
how can the system be aware of other systems that collect data 
about billsmith and how can the user be identified in these other 
systems?  
The algorithm we developed can support the adaptive systems 
in discovering whether billsmith has a profile in other systems on 
the Web. The bigger the set of crawled systems, and the number 
of users of these systems, the higher the probability of discovering 
                                                                 
1 In the so called Social Web, people interact one with each other, 
sharing knowledge and interests. In this context, social system 
allow to create relations among users. 
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billsmith somewhere. In the public Web, crawling the data of big 
social networks offers the highest probability of finding billsmith. 
Moreover, social networks offer also the advantage that lots of 
profile data are public and up-to-date. 
The algorithm receives in input the small set of known data 
about billsmith and returns a set of profiles associated to an 
identification probability that represents the chance they belong to 
the searched user. Moreover, it returns a set of probable attributes, 
like billsmith’s age, city, interests, profession, etc. obtained from the 
billsmith’s data included in the retrieved profiles. Since each 
attribute is associated to an identification probability, the adaptive 
system can decide, for each one, to acquire it or not, according to its 
polices. 
To test our algorithm, we ran it on a set of real-world social 
systems. The evaluation showed good ability of the algorithm to 
identify users but showed also some limits. Currently we are 
working on the revision of the algorithm and its extension. In 
particular, we are working on the aggregation of user profiles data 
using heuristics rules and using ontologies. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 offers an 
overview of the related works, Section 3 describes the algorithm 
we propose for user identification, Sec. 4 provides the results 
obtained by running the algorithm on a set of real world social 
systems and Sec. 5 concludes and points at future research 
directions. 
 
2. Related works 
Cross-system personalization is growing in importance and 
diffusion. Already in 2001, Kobsa et al [10] observed that 
adaptive systems could use cross-system personalization to speed-
up the process of user model creation. This approach is also useful 
to the user, avoiding him/her to repeat the boring process of 
filling in similar forms for different services [14]. 
Systems partaking in the process of user data exchange can 
enrich their own profiles or can enrich repositories of user profiles 
[7]. In [1] the authors propose a framework to import and 
integrate user data from other recommender systems. Even though 
several obstacles exist to user data integration, such as different 
representation formats, different contexts of acquisition, privacy 
risks, etc., user models mediation can nevertheless be useful as a 
support to the personalization service. 
The use of standards such as SKOS, and in general standards 
related to the Semantic Web, can make easier sharing, exchanging 
and integrating data coming from different systems, as in Morpho 
framework [11]. In our approach, this could be useful especially 
in the last part of the process, when results are returned to be used 
by different applications. Instead, using it in the phase of search 
and comparison between profiles reduces the performances of the 
algorithm. 
Regarding the user identification issue, currently, only a few 
solutions have been suggested to support user-adaptive systems in 
discovering if they are referring to the same user. Sometimes, this 
issue has been considered as a starting assumption, without 
proposing specific solutions to face it; other times, identification 
was not a problem since the systems used a common 
identification mechanism. For example, in [12] user identification 
is ensured by making the user hold a passport with his/her data to 
be provided to the personalization systems he/she interacts with. 
In [15], the issue of user identification is managed by using 
OpenID (openid.net), an identification system developed in the 
spirit of the Web 2.0, which provides an authentication method to 
allow users to log on different services with the same digital 
identity. Other recent initiatives, like OpenSocial 
(opensocial.org), Connect2 and MySpaceID3, add also the 
possibility of profile portability across systems on the Web. All 
the solutions mentioned above require the application to join a 
framework or support proper protocols to allow the cross-systems 
user identification. Identifying the users across systems 
independently of the protocols supported by each system and 
independently of the authentication data supplied by the user is, 
so far, a challenge.  
The approach presented in this paper aims at uniquely 
identifying users and retrieving their data distributed on the 
profiles stored on different systems. It does not require the 
implementation of specific protocols and the provision of 
authentication data, even if, compared to the solutions above, it 
can use only the public data available on the Web. From this point 
of view, the work of Szomszor et al. [13] is very close to our 
project. They perform a cross-folksonomies profiling based on 
collecting all the tags used by a user on different Social Systems. 
For the automatic identification of users on different systems, 
they use the Google Social Graph API4, which includes a 
matching technique for cross-profiling based on the user 
homepage. In our framework we compare sets of attributes 
relative to the user as found in different social systems. The 
choice of using a set of user attributes and not only the homepage 
is aimed to identify also users who do not have a personal 
homepage or do not want to publicly display this information. 
Moreover, in our approach, user attributes are used not only for 
user identification, but also for obtaining an aggregated user 
profile.  
An interesting project regarding the aggregation of data from 
social networks is SONAR [6], an API for gathering and sharing 
social network information. In particular it is focused on 
identifying and exploiting relationships between individuals, who 
may be linked in several ways, as co-authors of papers, file co-
sharers, blog comments, etc. In this project, however, the issue of 
user identification cross-system is not specifically addressed. 
 
3. Cross-Systems Identity Discovery  
In the Social Web, users typically interact with different social 
systems (in the following SSs), having different accounts and thus 
different identities and profiles. Some of the data are private, but a 
big amount of these data are public (users make them public to be 
searched) and can be accessed by other people and systems which 
can reuse them (with the limitation that some data cannot be 
stored on third systems). Moreover, some of the data in these 
profiles are replicated, while other data do not overlap and 
provide new information about the user. As we will describe in 
this section, our approach exploits  replicated public data to 
perform user identification and the other data to enrich the user 
profile. Obviously, if the crawled SSs are popular and numerous, 
the probability of finding one or more profiles of the searched 
user increases. 
As in other related works (e.g. [11]), to have a SS crawled, a 
specific parser has to be developed.  
                                                                 
2 http://developers.facebook.com/connect.php 
3http://wiki.developer.myspace.com/index.php?title=Category:MySpaceID 
4 http://code.google.com/intl/it/apis/socialgraph/ 
Given a set of input attributes about the user to be searched, 
the SSs’ parsers search for user profiles that match the request. 
The result is passed to the User Identification process (Sec. 3.1), 
which calculates a score for each profile. Subsequently, for each 
retrieved profile, the Identification Probability technique 
calculates, starting from this score, a percentage value that we call 
IdP (Identification Probability)  and then calculates the 
probability that the new discovered user attributes actually belong 
to the searched user (Sec. 3.2).  
3.1 User Identification process 
As mentioned above, the algorithm requires some initial attributes 
about the user to set up the search. We refer to this set of initial 
attributes as input profile Pi, while we will refer to the retrieved 
profiles as Pr. The search process starts by looking for the given 
nickname included in the input profile and its possible variations, 
or looking for the full name, if included in the input profile. Once 
the user profiles, with matching nickname/full name, have been 
retrieved, the other initial attributes are used to compute a score of 
this match.  
In assessing this score, we consider the user identity as a 
collection of attributes [16]. The notion of identity is extremely 
important to disambiguate individuals. In the object-oriented 
programming, “identity” is defined as the set of properties of an 
object that allows it to be distinguished from the others. Referring 
to this definition, we consider the user identity as a collection of 
properties, or attributes, that uniquely represents a user.  
Among these identity attributes, we distinguish between 
attributes that are strong indicators of a positive match between 
the profiles and those that are strong indicators of a negative 
match. For example, the user’s homepage is a strong indicator of 
positive match; in fact, if its value is the same on two profiles, the 
probability that the two profiles belong to the same user is high. 
Other attributes, especially persistent user attributes, work as 
strong indicators to trigger profiles that cannot belong to the same 
user. For example, the match of gender in two profiles is not very 
significant, since the probability for each value is 0.5; conversely, 
a negative match is a strong indicator to exclude a match between 
such profiles. We apply this mechanism by defining a table of 
weights for positive and negative matches and then performing a 
semi-combinatorial weighed match between the attributes in Pi 
and the corresponding attributes included in the retrieved profiles 
Pr. Moreover, the final score takes into account also the 
specificity of the nickname, namely how uncommon and rare it is. 
We define the specificity score as a function of the length of the 
nickname (long nicknames are presumably more specific than 
shorter ones) and of its rareness in terms of combination of 
letters, numbers and special characters, in a sample of the 
system’s population. For a more detailed description, refer to [4]. 
Notice that, given the results of the evaluation that will be 
presented in Section 4, we are working on slightly modifying  
these algorithms in order to solve some problems and in particular 
we are working on the formula for combining the scores from the 
nickname match and scores from the other attributes. 
As a result of the User Identification process, for each crawled 
social system, the algorithm returns: i) the list of discovered user 
profiles Prj,  ii) their score and  iii) the set of user attributes 
discovered, included in the retrieved profiles. 
As an example, let us consider a system that needs to identify 
a user given the following initial user attributes: nickname: 
billsmith;  gender: male; country: California. 
To simplify the example, let us assume that the algorithm has 
been run on two social systems only, SS.1 and SS.2, and that, 
based on such a query, it returns the user profiles Pr reported in 
Table 1: two profiles out of SS.1 and four profiles out of SS.2. For 
each profile the algorithm returns a score of the match with the 
input profile and the set of attributes stored in the retrieved 
profiles. These attributes include the user attributes provided to 
the algorithm as input profile and a set of other attributes, 
previously unknown.  
Table 1.  Example of results of the User Identification process, 
given an input profile Pi with the following initial user attributes: 
nickname: billsmith; gender: male; country: California 
 Profiles 
Pr 
Score Discovered user attributes 
1 0.67 
Nickname: billsmith; gender: 
male;  age: 22; city: San Diego; 
country: California SS.1 
2 0.50 Nickname: billsmithers44;  city: Sacramento;  country: California 
1 0.55 Nickname: billsmith_1999; gender: male;  country: California 
2 0.55 Nickname: billsmit77; gender: male;  country: California 
3 0.66 Nickname: billsmith2009; age: 22;  country: California 
SS.2 
4 0.44 Nickname: bill_s;  city: Sacramento;  country: California 
 
Analyzing such attributes, we can see that some of the 
profiles seem more similar than others. We are working on 
finding relations between profiles in order to discover if couples 
of attributes on two different social systems could belong to the 
same user.  
Consider the example above. In such an example, the user 
profile 1 in SS.1 and the user profile 3 in SS.2 share, together 
with all the correct values of the initial attributes, the value of the 
user attribute age, which is a discovered new attribute, since it 
was not provided as initial attribute. At the same time, the user 
profile 2 in SS.1 and the user profile 4 in SS.2 share the value of 
the discovered new user attribute city. We observe that the match 
of one or more new discovered attributes on profiles of two 
different social systems can be seen as a sort of connection 
between the profiles. It links the two profiles, increasing the 
probability they belong to the same user. 
The problem is how to exploit this information coming from 
the relationship between similar profiles in different social 
systems. We intend to use this relationship to adjust and possibly 
increase, the score of a pair of similar profiles. 
The issue originates from the consideration that the score of a 
retrieved profile highly depends on the number of attributes that 
match with those in the input profile. A profile with few matching 
attributes, and thus a low score, but linked to another profile, 
which has been granted a high score, can receive a boost from this 
correlation, increasing its original score to a value at most equal 
to that of the correlated richer profile. We are working on tuning 
the procedure to obtain this result. 
3.2 Identification Probability calculation 
In the previous step, the identification process returned the 
score of the retrieved profiles Pr and the new attributes 
discovered.  
The next step of the identification process is converting the 
score of Pr into a percentage value (IdP) defined as a sort of 
probability, conditioned by the initial attributes in the input profile 
Pi and, slightly, by the probability of the other retrieved profiles 
Pr:  IdP(Pri|Pi,Pr). 
Converting the score into a percentage value has the advantage of 
using a self-explaining measure of correctness of the retrieved 
profile, avoiding a user profile to be bound to a certain score 
threshold. The procedure we used to convert the score of Pr into a 
percentage is mapping the score of Pr to a percentage value on a 
scale 0%-100%, where 100% corresponds to the maximum score 
the retrieved profile Pr can obtain, given Pi, with the condition 
that such a maximum value is over a specified threshold. The 
maximum score that Pr can obtain, given Pi, is calculated by 
matching Pi with itself (using the algorithm in Sec. 3.1).  
Moreover, given that the IdP of Pr slightly depends also on the 
IdP of the other profiles retrieved on the same SS, we use a 
variation of the conditional probability formula 
P(x|y)=P(xΛy)/P(y), namely (favorable 
Pr)/(total Pr), to calculate this value, combining it with the 
probability as above defined. 
According to the Identification Probability calculation, the 
scores in the example in Table 1 are converted as reported in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Identification Probability (IdP) estimation for each 
profile. 
 Profiles 
Pr 
Score IdP 
 
1 0.67 36.8% 
SS.1 
2 0.5 5.9% 
1 0.55 7.2% 
2 0.55 7.2% 
3 0.66 23,6% 
SS.2 
4 0.44 2.2% 
 
Considering the discovered attributes, as displayed in Table 
3, each attribute value is coupled with the list of the SSs where 
the attributes come from, each with a probability percentage 
inherited from the IdP of the profiles to which they belong 
(column 3). Moreover, an average probability percentage 
(column 4) for that value is provided. Currently, it is simply 
calculated as an average of the percentages in column 3 for each 
attribute. This is a rough estimation, aimed at showing the 
possibility to expand and enrich a given user profile, even starting 
from a relatively low number of initial data.  
We plan to refine and improve this calculation, by introducing 
heuristic rules to combine the attribute values and ontologies to 
generalize or specialize the value of the discovered attributes.  
 
 
Table 3.  Discovered Attributes 
Attr. 
discov. 
Value Source (SSs) Attr. Prob. 
22 SS.1.1  (36.8%) 
Age 
22 SS.2.3  (23.6%) 
30.2% 
San Diego SS.1.1  (36.8%) 36.8% 
Sacramento SS.1.2    (5.9%) City 
Sacramento SS.2.4    (2.2%) 
4% 
 
It is important to notice that the attributes that can be 
discovered are numerous and various. Depending on the crawled 
social system, the algorithm can retrieve the user’s bookmarks 
(e.g. Delicious, StumbleUpon, etc.), his/her interests (e.g. 
MySpace, Facebook, Diig, etc.), photos (e.g. Flickr), friends (e.g. 
Facebook), people followed (e.g. Twitter) , profession, education, 
connected people (e.g. Linkedin), etc. 
However, the preliminary need is that the searched user is 
properly identified. 
 
4 Experimental Evaluation 
The definition and set up of the algorithm described in the 
previous sections were performed using a recurrent process of 
definition-evaluation-tuning of the algorithms. This section 
focuses on the final cycle of evaluation, structured in two steps: 
1. given a set of input profiles, calculating the probability of 
identifying other profiles belonging to the same user on other 
social systems (Sec. 4.1) 
2. measuring the accuracy (precision and recall) of the distribution 
probability calculated in the previous step (Sec. 4.2). 
To perform the evaluation, we ran the algorithm on two 
popular SSs, MySpace and Flickr. This required the parsers for 
such systems to be built.  
However, to check the accuracy of the retrieved profiles, this 
was not enough: we needed a real world dataset, made of user 
profiles linked to profiles of the same user on MySpace and 
Flickr. A dataset like that is available on Profilactic 
(profilactic.com), an aggregator where users can specify data 
about themselves and link their Profilactic profile to their own 
profiles on other social systems. For our evaluation, we selected 
the Profilactic profiles with links both to MySpace and to Flickr 
profiles.  
The core of the evaluation was providing the algorithms with 
Profilactic profiles, hiding the links to MySpace and Flickr 
profiles and letting the service to retrieve them on the two SSs. To 
this aim, beside the parsers for MySpace and Flickr, mentioned 
above, we developed a parser for extracting the dataset of the 
Profilactic profiles.  
Sampling. On January 2010, we extracted the Profilactic profiles 
containing links both to MySpace and to Flickr profiles. On a 
total of 511 profiles extracted from Profilactic, we selected the 
full profiles, namely the profiles with all the following types of 
attributes filled in: nick or full name, age, gender, city, province, 
country (besides the links to MySpace and to Flickr profiles). We 
obtained 333 profiles, and we extracted a sample of 300 profiles, 
according to a random sampling strategy. 
In the following we provide details about the first and second 
step of the evaluation. 
4.1 Calculating the Probability Distribution of User 
Identification 
As a first step of the experimentation, we ran the algorithms using 
as input attributes the profiles of our sample, hiding information 
about MySpace and Flickr profiles. The objective was to calculate 
the User Identification Probability IdP(Prj|Pii,Pri), being Pii 
the set of input profiles (with 0<i<=300), Prj the profiles 
retrieved on MySpace and Flickr with an associated probability of 
belonging to the same user and Pri the retrieved profiles that 
condition the final IdP, as defined in Sec. 3.2.. 
In order to perform a realistic simulation of a querying system 
searching for a user profile, we subdivided the evaluation in 8 
tests, by varying the number and type of the users' attributes 
provided to the algorithm as input profile Pi. In this way Pi can 
be made of k=8 different combinations of attributes (a), so that 
we evaluate 8 different probabilities IdP(Prj|Pii=ak).  
As said before, the complete Profilactic profiles include 
information about the user nick/full name, age, gender, city, 
province and country. We group together full names and nicks 
since, in the evaluated social networks, full name is often filled in 
by users as a nickname. Moreover, since province and country 
can be mostly derived by city, we just consider the attribute city. 
Running the algorithm, for each test we obtain (see Sec. 3.2) a 
list of profiles retrieved on Flickr and on Myspace, each one 
associated to a probability of identification IdP and a list of 
attributes, with an associated probability, coming from the retrieved 
profiles. 
 
Results for the IdP(Prj | Pii) on each test  and for the average 
IdP(Prj | Pii)   
Considering the probability of identification of each  Pr  profile 
retrieved in each test, we obtain a distribution of probability of 
identification for each combination ak of attributes. Fig. 1, 
displays the probability distribution obtained in each of the 8 
tests. Notice that the retrieved profiles Prj, on the x-axis, include 
all the profiles retrieved in all tests. Such profiles are numbered in 
descending order (Pr1 is the profile with x=1 and with y=the 
highest probability of identification). Notice, moreover, that we 
refer to the attributes of each test with their initial letter. 
Fig. 1 displays also the average result for the eight tests (in 
the figure, it is the dotted red line). Indeed, the main reason for 
splitting the evaluation in 8 tests is the possibility to obtain a 
realistic average result, by combining the probabilities of 
identification estimated for each different combination of input 
attributes. Moreover, this splitting allows us to analyze  if  the  
probability of identification significantly changes by changing the 
type and number of attributes provided to the algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Probability of identifying MySpace and Flickr profiles 
belonging to the Profilactic users. 
 
Changes can depend both on the algorithm (e.g. the weights used 
for attributes) and on the real data available in the social networks 
considered. As it can be seen, the distribution is very polarized in 
all the tests so that, considering the average result, all the profiles 
under the third decile have a probability of identification over 
86%, which means that more than 290 profiles are identified with 
a very high probability (given that each one of the 300 Profilactic 
profiles has a link on both the social networks, the maximum 
number of correct profiles that can be retrieved is 600). 
4.2 Evaluating the accuracy of the probabilities 
associated to the retrieved profiles  
In this section we introduce the second step of the evaluation, 
which consists in evaluating if the probabilities of identification 
obtained are correct, that is evaluating the accuracy of the 
identification of profiles. 
To this purpose, we exploited the dataset of Profilactic 
profiles. The availability of this dataset allowed us to use the same 
set of data as experimental set, also called test set, and as control 
set (namely the set used as a standard of comparison in a control 
experiment). In the previous step of the evaluation we provided 
the Profilactic profiles to our algorithm, hiding information about 
the links to MySpace and Flickr profiles. Then we compared the 
profiles retrieved by the algorithm with the true profiles on 
MySpace and Skype associated to each Profilactic profile. 
Notice that, as regard to the accuracy of the probability of the 
discovered attributes, in the following we will not display specific 
results, being such results highly correlated to the IdP of the 
retrieved profiles.  
To evaluate the accuracy of the identification, we used a 
technique similar to those frequently used in Information 
Retrieval: the Precision and Recall metrics [8]. In measuring 
Precision and Recall, we considered as true retrieved profile those 
profiles which have been correctly identified by applying the User 
Identification Algorithm. 
In Table 4 we provide the results of Precision and Recall of 
the average identification probabilities IdP(Pr | Pi)  computed in 
the previous step as a mean between the 8 tests. The identification 
probabilities of the retrieved profiles are grouped in ten ranges: 
0<IdP<10%, 10<=IdP<20%, etc. and for each Precision and 
Recall result we specify, in brackets, the numerator and 
denominator of the metrics. Finally, Table 5 displays precision 
and recall for progressive IdP thresholds.  
Table 4. Precision and Recall of the average identification 
probabilities IdP(Pr | Pi)   
Precision of average IdP(Pr|Pi)  
Range % IdP of 
retrieved 
profiles % 
Precision % 
(true Prj / Prj)1  
 
Recall % 
%  (over 
600) 
 
IdP 0 -9 
Idp 10 -20 
IdP 20-29 
IdP 30-39 
IdP 40-49 
IdP 50-59 
IdP 60-69 
IdP 70-79 
IdP 80-89 
IdP 90-99 
IdP 100 
 
4,5 
14,5 
24,5 
34,5 
44,5 
54,5 
64,5 
74,5 
84,5 
94,5 
100 
 
5 (28.5/572.4)  
14.3 (13/91.1) 
28.6 (16/55.9)  
38.9 (14.6/37.6)  
48.2 (15.1/31.3)  
65.0 (23.5/36.1) 
75.5 (34.6/45.9)  
81.3 (40.7/50.1)  
88.1 (46.5/52.7)  
89.9.1 (57/63.4) 
94.9 (150.5/158.6) 
 
4.7 
2.2 
2.2 
2.4 
2.5 
3.9 
5.8 
6.8 
7.7 
9.5 
25.3 
Tot 73% 
1 We report decimal values since they are mean values. 
 
Table 5. Recall and Precision for progressive IdP thresholds  
Range % 
 
IdP Thresholds  
% 
  
 
IdP 0 -9 
Idp 10 -20 
IdP 20-29 
IdP 30-39 
IdP 40-49 
IdP 50-59 
IdP 60-69 
IdP 70-79 
IdP 80-89 
IdP 90-99 
IdP 100 
 
IdP 100 --> R. 25.3% - P. 94.9%  
IdP over 90%  --> R. 34.8% - P. 93.4%  
IdP over 80% --> R. 42.5% - P. 92.4% 
IdP over 70% --> R. 49.3% - P. 90.7% 
IdP over 60% --> R. 55.1% - P. 88.8% 
IdP over 50% --> R. 59% - P. 86.7% 
IdP over 40% --> R. 61.5% - P. 84% 
IdP over 30% --> R. 63.9% - P. 80.4% 
IdP over 20% --> R. 66.1% - P. 75% 
IdP over 10% --> R. 68.3% - P. 66.1% 
IdP 0% --> R. 73% - P. 88.8% 
 
 
Notice that Precision values have to be read by comparing them 
with the estimated IdP (second column in Table 4) since the 
evaluation aims at testing if the probabilities provided to a 
requiring system are reliable or not. In this way, the choice 
whether to accept or not profiles with probabilities below some 
threshold depends on the querying system itself. As it is clear 
from the table, the distance of the estimated IdP from the true 
probabilities (precision), for a given range of probabilities, is very 
low, and thus the result is good.  
The distance between IdP and precision can be also seen in Fig. 2. 
Considering Table 4, we observe that the overall Recall is 73%, 
but, as typical, it has an inverse relationship with Precision, hence 
it is possible to increase the former only at the cost of reducing 
the latter. 
 
Fig. 2 Distance between prevision and true values. 
 
Table. 5 shows the relation of the two metrics for progressive IdP 
thresholds. We can observe that even with IdP thresholds over 
60%, the Recall does not decrease too much, being 55.1%, and 
the mean Precision is 88.8%. 
Notice, moreover, that Recall includes all those profiles that 
cannot be intrinsically retrieved, given the definition of the 
algorithm (e.g. profiles with username completely different from 
the input profile and no full name available). We estimated that at 
least 20% of profiles cannot be identified, given the features of 
our algorithm, mainly non consistent profiles belonging to the 
same user, or with errors and linguistic variations. 
Besides providing an average evaluation of the discovery 
probability, as explained in the previous section, the objective of 
performing 8 different tests was also to analyze the impact of 
providing the algorithm with different types and number of 
attributes. From this point of view, it is interesting to note the  
relevance of the attribute city, which entails the increase of recall 
values with respect to tests where it is not indicated. This is due to 
the fact that our algorithm gives city a weight higher than other 
attributes such as gender and age in case of positive match 
(depending on the a priori probability of their values). 
As a final remark, let us consider that using Profilactic as a 
dataset we wanted to test the validity of the algorithm, not the 
probability of identification of a user in a real context. In fact, 
people that use an aggregator of profiles, as Profilactic subjects, 
are users probably more careful than other users in filling in the 
attributes of their profile. Moreover, Profilactic sample was very 
useful, providing a test set and a control set, but with limited 
dimension. The  size of our sample should be increased in order to 
be more significative. 
5  Conclusions 
In a cross-systems personalization scenario, user identification, 
which means for different user-adapted systems partaking into the 
user data exchange process to discover if they are referring to the 
same user, is so far a challenge.  
This paper presents an approach to support adaptive systems 
to uniquely identify users on different social systems and to 
retrieve the user data distributed over the profiles stored in such 
systems. The approach we present does not require the provision 
of authentication data and user identification, since it is performed 
by using the public data available on the Web.  
To test such algorithm we ran it on two social networks: MySpace 
and Flickr.  
One of the main advantage of our approach is that it does not 
require the implementation of specific protocols and the provision 
of authentication data. Moreover, notice that the algorithm we 
implemented and the scenario above allows to exploit the public 
data collected from social systems.  
Anyway, notice that the approach is quite flexible, since it can 
be implemented as well within a specific framework of co-
operating systems, institutions, organizations. In this case, the 
distributed profiles that can be crawled can include not only public 
data, but also all data our service is authorized to access to. This 
possibility extends the applicability of the approach, which, 
otherwise, could be limited with respect to the possible needs of a 
personalization system. Depending on the kind of crawled systems 
the data about users can be very specific and domain dependent. 
This requires particular attention in matching the attributes since 
their meaning could be different. The phases of parsers’ building 
have always to be realized with a careful analysis of the attributes 
that will be matched. Anyway, given that these phase are manual 
and not automatic, they do not determine relevant problems. 
Regarding possible limitations, we should consider that the 
user identification and attributes discovery can be limited by the 
fact that the profiles scattered across social system are not always 
correct and updated. However we notice that social systems, and 
social networks in particular, are used to have relationships with 
friends, for profession aims, etc. thus users are motivated to 
provide true data and to update them. A further consideration 
regards the Identification Probability IdP (Sect. 3.2) and the 
choice of a third system can do whether to accept or not the 
retrieved profiles, given the initial known attributes for the search. 
The possibility of knowing the Precision and Recall for different 
IdP thresholds and for different combinations of attributes can 
support this decision. Considering the average results of different 
combinations of attributes, we saw, in Table 4, that for a threshold 
IdP over 50%, the Precision and Recall are good enough: 
respectively over 86,7% and 59%, thus the advice to a searching 
system could be to accept the results over such a threshold. 
Varying the combination of initial attributes provided, Precision 
and Recall change for each threshold. 
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